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Abstract
Over the last two decades, the use of antidumping (AD) measures has been characterized
by two main features. First and foremost, it has increased dramatically. Moreover, it has
apparently not - to a large extent - been used to counteract the existence of dumping, but
rather in a strategic or retaliatory fashion. These empirical ndings have led many to propose
the elimination of this instrument altogether, on the basis that its current use is arbitrary and,
consequently, welfare reducing.
We argue that these concerns may be unfounded since, in a world of restricted trade policy
instruments, a retaliatory use of AD might be welfare enhancing. By modeling the trade rela-
tionship between countries as a repeated game of hidden information, we show that retaliation
can be welfare increasing with respect to a rigid rule on the use of AD. We stress the fact that,
underlying this result, is the unavailability of transfers or export subsidies in the current world
trading system.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, the use of antidumping (henceforth, AD) has increased signicantly.
According to Prusa [25], there were 69 AD complaints led or reported to GATT in 1980: by 1998,
this gure had increased to 246. Not only did the use of AD intensify among traditionalusers
during this period, but it was also adopted by countries who had not used it before, tripling the
total number of nations using it by 1998.
Along with this increase in the use of AD, there has been a shift in the perception of the
incentives that underlie its use. The traditional explanation was based on the existence of dumped
imports, goods sold either at a price below the one in the exporters domestic market or at a price
below his costs of production. The use of AD duties under such circumstances is allowed by the
GATT/WTO code whenever the dumped imports are proven to have caused material injury to
domestic rms.
More recently, however, various authors have suggested that the underlying reasons for AD
could be strategic in nature. In particular, there seems to be ample evidence that a signicant
motive behind AD lings lies in its retaliatory use by the involved parties. In this sense, Finger
[15] has argued that countries that use AD tend to apply it against each other, and not against
countries that do not use this instrument to begin with. To back this claim, he notes that during
the 1980s approximately two thirds of AD cases were led against countries who also used this
type of duties. Along the same lines, Prusa [25] has argued that many countries appear to le for
AD duties against countries who have done the same to them in the past.
In an extensive empirical study, Prusa and Skeath [26] have analyzed the trends in worldwide
AD ling during the past two decades, trying to explain the motives underlying the use of this
measure. To do so, they use data on all AD cases led or reported to the GATT/WTO between
1980 and 1998 to test for evidence of economic and strategic motives. In terms of the former,
they look for evidence of AD cases being led against large suppliers or suppliers who have large
percentage surge in imports. In terms of strategic motives, they look for indications of club
or retaliatory lings of AD cases. Club lings refer to the use of AD against countries that
have previously used this instrument themselves, regardless of whom they have used it against.
Retaliatory lings, on the other hand, are those carried out by a country against trading partners
that have in turn used AD against it in the past.
Their results seem to provide strong support for the strategic view of antidumping. In par-
ticular, they nd that of all AD cases led between 1980 and 1998, three-quarters of them are
consistent with the club e¤ect and one half are consistent with retaliation incentives. Addition-
ally, their statistical tests on annual lings at the country level suggest that about 50% of the
observations provide statistically signicant support for the strategic hypothesis.
Adopting a di¤erent line of research that focuses on industry ling decisions in the United
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States, Blonigen and Bown [12] have recently found evidence suggesting that the use of AD is af-
fected by the threat of retaliation through the same channel. In particular, they nd that industries
seem less likely to initiate petitions against rms from countries which have active AD provisions
and are at the same time an important destination for their exports.
This mounting evidence regarding the discretionary use of antidumping has led many to argue
in favor of eliminating this policy tool altogether. To illustrate these opinions we can mention Kit-
gaard and Schiele [19], who critisize both the theory behind AD regulations and the way in which
they are applied. Regarding the former, they consider the concept of dumping itself to be seri-
ously awed from an economic perspective, while they also question the procedures used to review
dumping allegations. In a similar spirit, Bareld [7] argues that AD measures are fundamentally
at odds with the free trade policies that have dramatically increased global welfare over the last
half century.1
The object of the present paper is to provide a theoretical explanation for the empirical
evidence regarding the strategic use of AD, and to argue that the latter may be welfare enhancing.
Within the aforementioned evidence, we focus on retaliatory AD lings, which seems to be the
most signicant form of strategic application of this instrument.
We must stress that, since it refers to the observed use of AD in the absence of evidence
suggestive of dumping, our model abstracts from the latter phenomenon.2 We therefore treat AD
as tari¤s that may be adjusted by governments at their discretion, an assumption that - in our view
- is not overly restrictive when applied to the use of AD in which we are interested. In essence,
then, our model applies to the discretionary use of tari¤s in general: in light of the evidence and
debate regarding the use of AD, though, we choose to focus on this policy instrument.
Within the GATT/WTO framework, AD is a discriminatory and unilateral form of protection.
The latter feature, in particular, generates room for incentive problems if this instrument can be
used in a discretionary manner. Although it is true that the use of AD is governed by rules and
procedures and is therefore not fully discretionary, we assume this to be the case. Once again,
insofar as the underlying empirical evidence seems to nd that a substantial proportion of AD use
is not explained by the existence of dumping, we feel justied in adopting this approach.
We use a stylized model of bilateral trade based on Bagwell and Staiger [10], which we analyze
in a repeated scenario and modify to include unobserved political preferences. The latter feature
is included to accommodate the empirical importance of political considerations in understanding
the use of AD,3 and we thus interpret AD as part of a mechanism that grants tari¤s the exibility
1Barelds critiques of AD refer mostly to its use in high-tech sectors, which may have some particular character-
istics that our model does not address.
2We must stress that when we mention the use of AD in the absence of dumping, we refer to the lack of evidence
suggestive of dumping in the data. We do not consider whether, formally, dumping has been shown to exist by the
pertinent legal authority.
3See Hansen (1990), Moore (1992) and Hansen and Prusa (1997) for evidence regarding the importance of political
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required to adjust to changing political preferences.
In our two good, two country model, governments maximize welfare by raising their import
tari¤s when their valuation of the import competing sector is high, and by decreasing them other-
wise. However, since political preferences are unobservable, governments have an incentive to raise
their tari¤s above e¢ ciency levels in order to a¤ect the terms of trade in their favor. We show that,
in the presence of transfers or export subsidies, it is possible to achieve e¢ ciency by o¤setting the
terms of trade gains through the use of other instruments. However, since the former are seldom
observed in the world and the use of the latter is restricted under GATT/WTO, we then analyze
the maximum level of e¢ ciency attainable in their absence.
In such a scenario, the only instrument that governments control at any point in time are
import tari¤s; thus, if governments are to be truthful about their political preferences, present
actions must have some impact on expected future payo¤s. Within this setting, we show how
a retaliatory use of AD may be welfare enhancing with respect to the adoption of static rules
governing its use.
Our underlying argument is conceptually very simple: once governments are refrained from
freely using all their instruments, it might well be that a retaliatory use of the remaining ones is
welfare enhancing. Note how this notion is reminiscent of Tinbergens work, which we believe is
particularly useful to interpret our results. In designing rules for international cooperation, it must
be considered that the elimination of some instruments which are normally available to governments
might trigger the use of the remaining ones in new and unforseen ways. In our particular setup,
this is exactly the case of retaliation, which may increase overall welfare when the use of other
instruments is restricted but the objectives to be attained remain unchanged.
To obtain our results, we draw on the theoretical work regarding repeated games of imperfect
information. From the work of Abreu, Pierce and Stachetti [1], in particular, and Fudenberg, Levine
and Maskin [16], we adopt the concept of Perfect Public Equilibrium (PPE). However, the former
work deals mostly with existence of equilibria, whereas we are mainly interested in their precise
characterization: additionally, our model is one of private information for a continuum of types, for
which - as far as we know - there are yet no results regarding the possibility of supporting e¢ cient
allocations as PPEs. Due to these reasons, we prove our main argument building on recent results
obtained in the repeated auctions literature ([2], [3], [4], [5], [28]), specically making use of Aoyagi
[3] for our structure and main results.
Within the trade literature, our paper is most closely related to the work of Bagwell and Staiger
[8] and Feenstra and Lewis [14]. The former deals with a repeated setting very similar to ours,
but in which there is no private information: thus, the equilibrium strategies are not subject to
the additional constraint of inducing truthtelling, and must only guarantee that governments have
considerations in the use of AD by the United States.
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no incentives to openly abandon cooperation. Since these incentives uctuate with the economic
environment, so does the level of cooperation that is sustainable at equilibrium. Feenstra and Lewis,
on the other hand, deal with static setting in which - at the moment of negotiating trade restrictions
- one government has private information regarding the political pressure it faces from domestic
producers. As in our model, then, there is an incentive to misreport this private information in order
to induce a favorable shift the terms of trade. Although similar in spirit, our approach di¤ers from
theirs in two ways. The rst and most important di¤erence is that they assume that governments
behave in a cooperative manner: our setting is noncooperative and the behavior of governments
is obtained as an equilibrium to a game of repeated interaction. A second di¤erence is that they
assume one-sided private information, whereas we analyze a game in which both governments have
private information regarding their domestic environment.
Our model displays interesting characteristics at di¤erent levels. In the rst place, it di¤ers
from previous theoretical research on the use of AD by abstracting from the role played by rms and
analyzing it instead within the context of strategic interaction between governments (henceforth,
strategic trade framework).4 The latter framework has been increasingly useful in understanding
the role of the world trade system and its particular regulations, and our analysis of AD is compat-
ible with existing research in this direction. Second, the modelling strategy is relatively new within
the aforementioned framework itself, which has not yet fully developed the potential of repeated
games of private information.5 Our paper tries to do so while hopefully yielding some insights on
the ongoing debate regarding the use of AD.
The structure of the paper is as follows: we rst present the static game in Section 2 and
briey comment on its properties. Section 3 explains the basic setup and notation of the repeated
game. In Section 4, equilibria of the latter are analyzed under the assumption that governments
can resort to more than one instrument: in particular, we show how the model allows for e¢ cient
equilibria in the presence of transfers or export subsidies. Section 5 concentrates on the repeated
game when import tari¤s are the only instruments that governments can use, and it contains our
main results regarding the retaliatory use of AD. Finally, Section 6 contains a brief discussion of
our results and provides a possible interpretation for them.
4 It may seem strange to analyze AD in a context of repeated interaction between governments, since dumping
investigations are initiated at the request of producers who presumably do not take such interaction into account.
But in our model, as will become clear, the political preference parameter could be interpreted as the political
inuence of producers: the fact that governments interact repeatedly, though, a¤ects the way in which this inuence
translates into trade policy.
5Although for di¤erent purposes, Lee [20] also analyzes issues of international trade policy within a repeated
framework of private information.
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2 The Static Model
2.1 Basic Setup
This section lays the foundations of the simple two country, two good model that will be used
throughout the paper, which draws heavily on Bagwell and Staiger [10]. Suppose there are two
countries, which we call home and foreign, that trade two competitively-produced goods, x and
y: Each of these goods is demanded in both countries according to a symmetric demand function
D, and we assume x (y) to be the natural import good of the home (foreign) country: Let pi
represent the domestic price of good i = x; y in the home country and let the domestic demand and
supply functions for good i be represented by the linear functions D(pi) and Qi(pi), respectively.
In particular, we assume that D(pi) =   pi, Qx(px) = px and Qy(py) = py. Analogously, we
denote foreign demand and supply functions by D(pi ) =  pi , Qy(py) = py and Qx(px) = px.
It is assumed that  <  in order to capture the fact that x is the natural import good of home. In
the present model, countries are free to choose import tari¤s and export subsidies, denoted by x
and y in the case of home. The import tari¤ and export subsidy of foreign are denoted respectively
by y and x.6
The market equilibrium of the static model is easily characterized, for given levels of import
tari¤s and export subsidies. Consider rst the market for good x: For any given domestic price,
home has an import function of
Mx =   ( + )px (1)
On the other hand, the export function of foreign is given by,
Ex = (+ )p

x    (2)
Note also that, if we dene pwx to be the world price of good x, it must be the case that
px = p
w
x + x, while p

x = p
w
x + 

x. Thus, replacing these expressions in (1) and (2) and solving for
the value of pwx that equals world imports and exports of good x; we obtain that
pwx =
2  ( + )x   (+ )x
2 +  + 
(3)
Hence
px = p
w
x + x =
2+ ( + )x   (+ )x
2 +  + 
(4)
px = p
w
x + 

x =
2  ( + )x + ( + )x
2 +  + 
(5)
The equilibrium conditions for market y are dened in an analogous manner.
6As a convention, we let  j > 0 denote a positive level of tari¤ (subsidy) levied on the import (export) good j.
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2.2 Trade Policy
As we saw in the previous section, trade policy will a¤ect the equilibrium prices and the volumes
of trade in the markets for both goods. The present section characterizes government objectives
and analyzes the equilibrium trade policies under symmetric and asymmetric information, while
comparing them to the rst-best choices.
It is assumed that each governments preferences are inuenced by a political economy para-
meter,  (), which a¤ects its valuation of the import-competing sector and is drawn randomly
and independently in each period from a common uniform distribution with support [L; H ] and
density g. We will rst assume that governments can observe each others political parameter and
will later solve the static game under the assumption of private information.
We assume that governments maximize the sum of tari¤ revenues, consumer surplus and
producers surplus in each of the markets: in the case of the import good, the valuation given to
the latter is adjusted by the political economy parameter.7 Thus, the objective function of the
home government can be expressed as,
W (px; py; p
w
x ; p
w
y ) =Wx(px; p
w
x ) +Wy(py; p
w
y )
where Wx and Wy represent welfare derived from the x and y markets, respectively. These are
in turn dened by
Wx(px; p
w
x ) =
Z 

^
px
Dxdpx + x(px) + [px   pwx ]Mx
Wy(py; p
w
y ) =
Z 

^
py
Dydpy + y(py)  [py   pwy ]Ey
where x(px) and y(py) denote the prots of home producers of goods x and y as functions
of domestic prices, respectively, and - as was said earlier -  represents the political economy
parameter. Note that the welfare functions as expressed above depend solely on the world and
domestic prices of both goods and, ultimately, in the values of home and foreigns import tari¤s
and export subsidies. In the case of the foreign government, its welfare functions are analogous to
the ones depicted above with the di¤erence that the corresponding political economy parameter
() a¤ects the weight given to producers of good y: In order to simplify the exposition, we will
not derive closed form solutions for the general model. Instead, we will prove our results for the
7Thus, we follow Baldwin in interpreting the weights on producer surplus that exceed unity as representing
domestic political economy forces.
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general case and will sometimes invoke a particular parametrization of the model.8
Let us rst analyze the stage game under symmetric information. In such a case, both gov-
ernments observe each others political parameter and then simultaneously set their tari¤s and
subsidies, so as to unilaterally maximize their welfare. In other words, for given values of  and ;
home chooses x and y so as to solve,.
max W (px; py; p
w
x ; p
w
y )
x; y
(6)
while foreign chooses x and y in order to solve an analogous problem. From (6) we can
derive homes best response functions, which must satisfy the rst order conditions,
Wpwx
@pwx
@x
+Wpx
@px
@x
= 0 (7)
Wpwy
@pwy
@y
+Wpy
@py
@y
= 0 (8)
These conditions reect the well-known fact that trade policy inuences welfare through its
impact on the terms of trade and on domestic prices. For the importing government, an increase
in tari¤s has the following e¤ects: it increases the domestic price of the good, redistributing wealth
from consumers to producers while inducing a welfare loss, and it has a favorable e¤ect on the
terms of trade. The higher the political economy parameter, the higher is the positive weight given
to the redistributive e¤ect and the higher will be the desired tari¤s.
The Nash equilibria of the present model have been studied at length in the literature and
are well understood.9 In order to assess their properties in terms of e¢ ciency, however, let us rst
characterize the properties of e¢ cient tari¤s.
Note that, in order for pairs of tari¤s (x; x) and (y; y) to be e¢ cient, it must be the case
that they maximize the sum of home and foreigns welfare, i.e., they must be a solution to the
following maximization problem:
max Wx(px; p
w
x ) +W

x (p

x; p
w
x )
x; 

x
(9)
max Wy(py; p
w
y ) +W

y (p

y; p
w
y )
y; 

y
(10)
8The benchmark parametrization that we will refer to is similar to the one used by Bagwell and Staiger in [10],
and is given by
 = 1  = 1  = 1
2
 = 1 L = 1 H = 1:5
9See, for example, [10].
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It is straightforward to show from (9) and (10), as Bagwell and Staiger have done, that in the
present model aggregate welfare depends only on the net tari¤s in each market, i.e. on x  x and
y y; while the precise values of the tari¤s and subsidies determine the way in which total welfare
is distributed among governments. More precisely, we use a particular pair of e¢ cient tari¤s and
subsidies as our benchmark, which we call politically optimaltari¤s, denoted by POx and 
PO
x ;
and implicitly dened by the following rst order conditions,
Wpx
@px
@x
= 0 (11)
W px
@px
@x
= 0 (12)
Thus, politically optimal tari¤s are dened as the tari¤s (and subsidies) that governments
would choose if they did not take the terms of trade e¤ect into account, being therefore lower
(higher) than their Nash counterparts obtained from (7) and (8).
Due to the lack of political economy considerations in the export market, the politically optimal
export subsidy in the present model is always zero. Regarding the import market, on the other
hand, the politically optimal tari¤ will be strictly positive for all values of  > 1; and it will be
increasing in : Thus, the net tari¤ that arises from governments choosing their politically optimal
tari¤s and subsidies is simply POx (); and all combinations (x; 

x) for which 
PO
x () = x   x
deliver the same total welfare.
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile at this point to highlight one characteristic of welfare
functions in our model. Since they depend directly on world and local prices, which are in turn
determined solely by tari¤s and subsidies, welfare of home and foreign is ultimately a function of
the latter and can therefore be expressed indirectly in those terms. This is the approach we take
throughout the rest of the paper, and we therefore briey state the properties of welfare functions
so expressed. We can write the welfare of homes government as W ( ; ; ); where  = (x; y)
and  =
 
x; y

. The support for  is chosen so that W is twice continuously di¤erentiable with
respect to  and .10
Since we will always use politically optimal tari¤s as our benchmark, we will mostly be con-
cerned with e¢ cient tari¤s that lie below the reaction function (below the Nash-tari¤s) and for
these we have that welfare is increasing in the import tari¤, @W@x > 0; decreasing in the export
subsidy, @W@y < 0 and strictly concave in x ;
@2W
@2x
< 0: Also, it is always the case that @
2W
@x@
> 0:
Obviously, because of symmetry, the same assumptions and results hold for foreign.
10The support of  is relevant for this because, if the possible values of the parameter are too far apart there are
e¢ cient equilibria with no trade: at this point, then, W would clearly not be twice continuously di¤erentiable on the
tari¤s.
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Finally, it must be taken into account that the model presents a continuum of Nash equilibria
in which there is no international trade: to see this, imagine a situation in which import tari¤s
(export subsidies) are set so high (low) as to individually eliminate the exchange of goods between
both governments. Any such situation is clearly a Nash equilibrium, since no country can induce
trade by unilaterally lowering (raising) its tari¤ (subsidy). The following remark, which is taken
directly from Bagwell and Staiger, summarizes the discussion on the static model with symmetric
information.
Remark 1 In the static tari¤ game with symmetric information,
1. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium with positive trade volume (this follows from the strict
concavity of the welfare function).
2. In the aforementioned equilibrium, the Nash import tari¤ is positive while the Nash export
subsidy is negative, and all tari¤s are higher than their political optimal values.
3. There also exists a continuum of autarchy Nash equilibria.
The previous remark highlights a well known result of the strategic trade literature, by which
Nash tari¤s are ine¢ cient due to governmentsdesire to overexploit them in order to a¤ect the
terms of trade in their favor. In this sense, both governments could benet from a reciprocal
reduction of their tari¤s, since such a change could leave the terms of trade constant while reducing
everyones domestic prices.
Since in the present paper we are interested in the case of asymmetric information, we now
briey analyze the static model for the case in which governments cannot observe each others polit-
ical preferences. In this case, the game is assumed to be as follows: governments learn their types
at the beginning of each period, after which they set their tari¤s and subsidies in a simultaneous
fashion and trade takes place.
In such a scenario, welfare functions are determined exactly as before, with the only di¤erence
being that governments are uncertain about each others preferences. Thus, they choose the tari¤s
and subsidies that maximize expected welfare: in particular, we dene the welfare function of home
in the interim stage (i.e., after observing its own type, but not that of foreign) as,
W (x; y; 

x; 

y) =Wx(x; 

x) +
Z

Wy(y; 

y(
))g()d (13)
while that of foreign takes an analogous form (with the obvious di¤erence that welfare is
deterministic in the y market and random in the x market). Note from (13) that welfare on the x
market depends only on homes type, since foreign has no private information regarding this good.
In the y market, however, foreigns type will a¤ect its tari¤ and - consequently - the world price of
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this good. Thus, in choosing its level of subsidy, home maximizes expected welfare in the market
for its export good.
It is easy to show that the equilibrium of the asymmetric information case involves the same
kind of ine¢ ciency that was previously described. This must indeed be the case, since the introduc-
tion of asymmetric information does not eliminate the terms of trade externality and - consequently
- governments have an incentive to set ine¢ ciently high (low) import tari¤s (export subsidies).
Lemma 1 The Nash equilibrium of the static game with asymmetric information entails subopti-
mally high (low) import tari¤s (export subsidies).
Proof. This result stems directly from our previous analysis and the proof is therefore omitted.
Thus, the properties of the original equilibria are preserved under asymmetric information,
entailing suboptimally high tari¤s and a consequent loss of e¢ ciency due to the existence of a
terms of trade externality. We now analyze a repeated version of the aforementioned game and
study its equilibrium payo¤s under di¤erent scenarios.
3 Repeated Game
We maintain the assumption of two countries, home and foreign, and extend the static model to
an innitely repeated scenario. As before, both governments receive a private signal  () about
their political preference, which are independently drawn from a common, uniform distribution
with support [L; H ] and density g. Depending on the scenario considered, each government can
set the level of one or more policy instruments.
We analyze this repeated game by using a mechanism design approach (see e.g. Athey et
al. [5], Athey and Bagwell [4] and Aoyagi [2]). In particular, [2] discusses collusion in repeated
auctions and introduces a mechanism where the players communicate their private values to a
coordination center, which in turn instructs them how much to bid. We believe communication
between governments before tari¤-setting to be a realistic assumption and therefore follow this
approach. Intuitively, all we require then is that governments communicate before deciding on the
level at which to set their instruments.11
Coordination in our repeated game is modelled as follows: at the beginning of each period,
both governments report their private signals to the center according to a reporting rule () :
[L; H ] ! [L; H ]. Having received the reports ^ = (^; ^

), the center tells each government
the levels at which the available policy variables should be set. To do so, it uses an instruction
rule i = (i; i) : [L; H ]2 ! R2n, where R2n represents the policy space for both countries and n
11We also require the existence of a randomization device which countries can use to correlate their actions whenever
this is necessary. This assumption is standard in the repeated game literature.
11
denotes the number of available instruments: in our case, these instruments will be alternatively
given by import tari¤s, export subsidies and transfers of the numeraire good. The levels of the
policy instruments ultimately chosen by any of the governments are publicly observed. Given this
communication structure we model the behavior of governments as simply choosing a tari¤ rule
() : [L; H ]2 Rn ! Rn which maps their type, their report and the instruction rule given by
the center into actual tari¤s, subsidies or transfers.
Communication history for a government in period t in the repeated game is the sequence of
its reports and instructions in periods 1, 2, ..., t   1: Private history is the sequence of its private
signals  in periods 1, 2, ..., t   1: Finally, public history in period t is a sequence of instruction
rules used by the center and the values of the policy instruments actually chosen by both countries
in periods 1, 2, ..., t  1:
Homes (foreigns) strategy  is a pair of reporting and tari¤ rules (; ) for each period
dened as a function of its communication and private histories and of the public history at that
time. Dene ^ to be the honest and obedient strategy which selects the pair (^; ^) for all histories.
The coordination scheme C describes the centers choice of an instruction rule as a function of
communication and public histories. The game is assumed to start in a collusion phase, from which
it reverts to a punishment phase forever whenever there is an observable deviation by any of the
countries. In the punishment phase, countries are instructed to play the one-shot Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium of the static game as described above.
The coordination scheme C is an equilibrium if the pair  = (^; ^) is a perfect public
equilibrium (PPE) of the repeated game, i.e., if ^ is optimal against (^; C) after any public
history of the game.
Note that we will characterize equilibrium strategies by using the one-shot deviation property.12
These deviations, in turn, can be divided into two types which, following Athey and Bagwell [4], we
call on- and o¤-schedule deviations. The latter refer to deviations that are observable, i.e., setting
tari¤s at a level di¤erent from the one indicated by the center. On-schedule deviations, on the
other hand, are those that arise when countries misrepresent their type: obviously, these deviations
are not observable. To control for the latter constraints in the present model we will focus our
attention on their local properties, and then prove in each case that they are satised globally by
the presence of a single-crossing property (SCP).
4 Repeated game with more than one instrument
The present section analyzes the equilibria of the repeated game in the presence of more than one
instrument, namely, import tari¤s and transfers or import tari¤s and export subsidies. In such a
setting, the instruction and tari¤ rules will refer to all of the instruments involved: for example, in
12The one-shot deviation property is valid in our setup due to the boundedness of per-period payo¤s and discounting.
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the case of import tari¤s and transfers, the instruction rule will specify a level for both instruments,
and so will the tari¤ rule used by each country. The question addressed is whether there are e¢ cient
equilibria when each country controls more than one instrument.
In the presence of transfers, this question can be answered in a rather straightforward manner.
The ine¢ ciency of the model arises precisely because, if the center were to instruct each country
to apply the politically optimal import tari¤ associated to its report, countries would have an
incentive to over-represent their type in the latter. The reason for this is that they do not consider
the externality generated when they alter the terms of trade in their favor and against their trading
partner. Thus, any coordination scheme that leads countries to internalize this externality will
su¢ ce to achieve e¢ ciency. When transfers are feasible, the simplest such scheme is one that
instructs each country to pay a transfer equal to the externality it generates while setting its
import tari¤ at the politically optimal level associated to its report.
The fact that e¢ ciency is attainable in our setting when governments can resort to trans-
fers should not come as a surprise, as it is a common and well-understood result. Thus, we do
not prove it here and refer the interested reader to the appendix. Let t^(^t) denote the mapping
from announcements to transfers that - by internalizing the terms of trade externality - achieves
truthtelling and use PO(^) to denote politically optimal tari¤s associated to announcements. We
obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 In the presence of transfers and import tari¤s there exists a critical level of the
discount factor ^, such that for all   ^; an e¢ cient coordination scheme C characterized by
instruction rules (it; it ) = ((POx (^t); t^(^t)); ((POy (^

t ); t^(^

t ))) for all t can be supported as a perfect
public equilibrium.
Note that the possibility of resorting to these two instruments allows countries to achieve
e¢ ciency within all periods by transferring welfare between them. In other words, there is no
need to resort to the manipulation of future payo¤s, because the availability of su¢ ciently many
instruments allows for the achievement of e¢ ciency and incentive compatibility on a period-by-
period basis.
However, transfers among countries is something that we seldom observe in reality. There
could be a number of reasons behind this lack of transfers, ranging from issues of sovereignty to the
perception that a country resorting to an AD measure has already been hurt by its trade partner,
making it unfair to force him to pay for defending itself. Whatever these underlying reasons are,
we do not wish to analyze them here: instead, we ask ourselves what would happen in our repeated
game if we preclude countries from resorting to transfers.
We consider the e¤ects of such an assumption while allowing countries to resort to export
subsidies instead. Note that the preferred level of the latter are not a¤ected by the realization of
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the own political economy parameter. Thus, the instruction and tari¤ rules will now refer to the
levels of import tari¤s and export subsidies. In this case, homes welfare will be given by,
W (;C) =Wx(; x(^); 

x(^)) +
Z H
L
Wy(y(^

); y(^

))g()d + v (14)
where x and x represent, respectively, homes import tari¤ and foreigns export subsidy in
the market for x: As for foreigns welfare, it can be dened analogously. On-schedule incentive
compatibility then requires that,
@Wx
@^ j^=
= (Wpwx
@pwx
@x
+Wpx
@px
@x
)
@x()
@
+ (Wpwx
@pwx
@x
+Wpx
@px
@x
)
@x()
@
= 0
which can be expressed as,
@Wx
@~ j^=
=Wpx(
@px
@x
@x()
@
+
@px
@x
@x()
@
) +Wpwx (
@pwx
@x
@x()
@
+
@pwx
@x
@x()
@
) = 0 (15)
Obviously, then, any tari¤-subsidy instruction rule that satises,
@x()
@
@pwx
@x
@pwx
@x
=  @

x()
@
(16)
POx () = x()  x() (17)
will be enough to support truthtelling and e¢ cient tari¤s.13
The idea behind the previous conditions is as follows: suppose that the center chooses an
arbitrary value for the world prices (say, without loss of generality, the world price that would
result from applying the politically optimal import tari¤s when  is equal to its expected value).
Condition (16) basically says that world prices will always remain at that level, since import tari¤s
and export subsidies will respond to the announcement in such a way as to keep it invariant. Thus,
tari¤s and subsidies will always lie on the same iso-world price locus regardless of announcements.
However, the exact point on the locus on which they lie will depend on the announcement, since
e¢ ciency requires that (17) be satised at all points in time. Therefore, (16) and (17) jointly state
that tari¤s and subsidies in each market should be set at the intersection of some pre-specied
iso-world price locus and the e¢ ciency locus corresponding to the announcement.
If we denote tari¤s and subsidies satisfying (16) and (17) by ^x(^) and ^x(^); a rule instructing
the importing and exporting countries to set their tari¤s and subsidies at such levels would clearly
13The condition for e¢ ciency stems from the fact that - in our setup - world prices ultimately depend on net tari¤s.
This same feature guarantees that a pair of e¢ cient and IC import tari¤ and export subsidy always exists.
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satisfy both e¢ ciency and incentive compatibility for the importing country.14 Global incentive
compatibility, on the other hand, stems once again from the fact that the marginal welfare of an
increase in the domestic price of the import good is increasing in :
These conditions are very intuitive: the desire to overclaim ones type arises from the potential
benet of favorably a¤ecting the terms of trade. However, if the coordination scheme is such that
the exporting countrys subsidy decreases so as to eliminate the terms of trade e¤ect associated to
each report, there is no incentive to lie about ones type. This, in turn, can always be done in our
setting since there is no private information regarding the export sector. E¢ ciency comes from the
observation that, in the present model, all that matters for total welfare is the di¤erence between
import tari¤s and export subsidies: as long as this di¤erence is equal to the politically optimal
import tari¤, total welfare is maximized.15
Figure 1 illustrates the discussion. Suppose the world price is set at a pre-specied level which
we denote pwx : the iso-world price locus in the graph shows all the combinations of import tari¤s and
export subsidies that deliver this price in equilibrium. Now, for two values of the political economy
parameter in the importing country, 1 and 2 where 2 > 1, the upward sloping loci represent the
e¢ ciency frontiers, i.e., combinations of tari¤s and subsidies that maximize joint welfare.16 All the
mechanism does is to instruct, for each announcement made by the importing country, the tari¤-
subsidy pair that lies on the intersection of the iso-world price line and the corresponding e¢ ciency
locus: in this way, world prices are kept constant, eliminating the terms-of-trade externality while
achieving e¢ ciency.
Finally, since such a mechanism maximizes joint expected welfare, world prices in both markets
can always be chosen so as to avoid o¤-schedule deviations in the presence of Nash-reversion if
countries are su¢ ciently patient. The following proposition summarizes the previous discussion.
Proposition 3 In the presence of export subsidies and import tari¤s there exists a critical level of
the discount factor ^, such that for all   ^; an e¢ cient coordination scheme C characterized by
instruction rules (it; it ) = ((^x(^t); ^y(^

t )); ((^

x(

t ); ^

y(^

t ))) for all t can be supported as a perfect
public equilibrium.
According to the proposition, the presence of export subsidies could in principle help to achieve
e¢ ciency on a per-period basis. However, the use of this instrument is currently restricted under the
14Note that e¢ ciency rests on the assumption of private information only in the import side of the market. Thus,
tari¤s and subsidies need only be adjusted in response to the importing countrys announcement in order to achieve
e¢ ciency.
15This can be seen from the fact that, when we add governmentswelfare in any one market, the joint welfare
depends only on; a) the di¤erence between the import tari¤ and the export subsidy, and b) local prices. The latter,
in turn, depend only on the former (see Section 2.1).
16Obviously, they yield the same joint welfare as the pair (POx (); 0):
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Figure 1: E¢ cient Coordination Scheme with Tari¤s and Subsidies
GATT/WTO system.17 Additionally, note that a coordination scheme like the one described above
will repeatedly entail the use of export and/or import subsidies: although in our model countries
are not assumed to be liquidity constrained, the latter would seem a priori to be a justiable
concern in considering a real-world implementation of the scheme.
Thus, of the two additional instruments that would allow for the implementation of an e¢ cient
allocation - transfers and export subsidies - none of them are readily available to countries inter-
acting in the existing trading system. In the next section, we consequently analyze the e¢ ciency
of equilibria when import tari¤s are the only policy instruments to which countries can resort.
5 Repeated game with one instrument
5.1 Background and Related Literature
Once we restrict the set of instruments available to each government to just the import tari¤, there
is a problem in supporting an e¢ cient allocation as a PPE. The intuition is obvious: in order for
an allocation to be e¢ cient, it must be the case that - at each point in time - governments set
their tari¤s at the politically optimal levels. However, in order for them to do so, there must be an
incentive to truthfully reveal their type: in the absence of other instruments, this can only come
from a threat of future punishment, which itself must bring about some e¢ ciency loss.
17 In this regard, Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures explicitly prohibits subsidies
which are contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance.
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The setup that we thus face is that of an innitely repeated game of private information with
a continuum of types. This game falls in the class of innitely repeated games whose solution
or equilibrium concept can be analyzed relying on dynamic programming techniques. Repeated
games with perfect information are by now well understood, the main message being that any
individually rational and feasible payo¤ can be supported in equilibrium as long as the parties are
patient enough: this is the well known folk theorem.
When asymmetric information is introduced, however, the results are not so clear-cut. Al-
though most of the theoretical work in this respect has focused on games with unobservable actions
(moral hazard), it is possible to interpret a situation of private information in the exact same fash-
ion by letting the actions be mappings from the types to the public signal space. By doing so, [16]
state an (asymptotic) folk theorem when types are private, iid and have nite support. Athey and
Bagwell [4], in one of the best known applications in the literature, interpret the repeated problem
as a static one of mechanism design where future continuation payo¤s play the role of transfers.18
They obtain full collusive prots in a repeated Bertrand model with binary types. The driving force
behind their results is the nature of Bertrand competition and a restriction on the distribution of
the binary types, both of which allow them to redistribute welfare through continuation payo¤s
without sacricing e¢ ciency. Our model has neither of those two features.
It should be observed that, following [16], we could in principle achieve asymptotic e¢ ciency
by working with a nite typespace. However, as mentioned above, allowing for communication
motivates the use of a continuum of types. Moreover, neither [1] or [16] explicitly construct PPEs,
as they are mostly interested in their existence and e¢ ciency properties. By contrast, our main
interest lies precisely on the strategies played in a particular PPE and on their economic interpre-
tation.
Under our assumptions, on the other hand, there are no (asymptotic) e¢ ciency results avail-
able. There has, however, been a substantial amount of work devoted to analyzing this issue,
particularly in settings of collusion in repeated environments (see e.g. [21], [2], [28]). Among this
work, we will draw on the results of [2], in which it is shown that collusive payo¤s are increased by
the use of dynamic and retaliatory - as opposed to static - schemes.
5.2 The problem
The current debate regarding the use of AD seems to suggest that this policy tool is being used
in a discretionary manner, which is seemingly unrelated to the objective for which it was created.
In turn, this strategic and mostly retaliatory use of the instrument has led many to argue in favor
of the elimination of AD altogether. We will argue that such an elimination, or - more generally
- a xed rule that determines the way in which AD may be used, can be outperformed by a
18This mechanism design approach has been followed in subsequent work ( see [5],[6],[22]).
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dynamic scheme that includes some degree of retaliation. Our argument is constructed in this way
because we believe it to be simple while nonetheless illustrating the role of retaliation. We do
stress, however, that we could have used a di¤erent modeling strategy in order to obtain the same
qualitative results, possibly at the cost of losing the simple structure of our model.
The intuition behind our argument is simple: any static rule regarding the use of AD can be -
modulo a slight asymmetric adjustment - be used as punishment or reward in a dynamic mechanism
that includes the use of e¢ cient tari¤s at some of its stages. Therefore, such a mechanism will yield
an average payo¤ between that of the political optimum and that of the static rule. This must be
kept in mind when interpreting the mechanism developed in the next subsection.
As we are interested in studying how retaliation can serve as a way to keep countries from
using the AD clause all too abusively, we can interpret the government that sets the highest current
tari¤ as todays winner. This interpretation leads us naturally to model the repeated game in a
fashion similar to that of a repeated auction. Under such an analogy, retaliation would call for a
continuation payo¤ penalty for todays winnerwhile rewarding the current loser.
Of course, it should be stressed that this is not the only way in which strategic interaction
might a¤ect equilibrium payo¤s. Another possibility would be, for example, to deter the overuse of
AD through the threat of a (symmetric) trade war. Such a setting, in which high tari¤s eventually
trigger a trade war on equilibrium in which all countries are punished symmetrically, would be
reminiscent of the work of Green and Porter [13], Rotemberg and Saloner [27] and Athey, Bagwell
and Sanchirico [5]. It must be noted that a multi-country model developed to study these symmetric
equilibria could shed some light on the pure club e¤ectfound empirically by Prusa and Skeath
[26], since it could deliver a punishment executed by all countries simultaneously regardless of who
was hurt by the original AD measure.19
Albeit interesting, we choose to focus here on pure retaliation for the following reasons. First
and foremost, retaliation seems to be empirically more common than the pure club e¤ect, roughly
doubling it. Additionally, in our two-country world it becomes impossible to distinguish between
the two: any clubuse of AD will necessarily be retaliatory. In the following section, then, we
introduce our mechanism and show simply that some degree of retaliation always outperforms any
static rule governing the use of AD.
5.3 The mechanism
The mechanism proposed is as follows. The collusive phase, which lasts as long as there are no
observable deviations, is characterized by a symmetric stage (S) and two asymmetric stages (A and
A), dened as follows:
19By pure club e¤ectwe mean the use of AD by a government against others who have used the instrument in
the past, but not against that specic country.
18
 In the symmetric stage, both governments announce their types to the center, which in
turns instructs them to set their tari¤s at the politically optimal level associated to their
announcements. The per-period welfare in this phase depends on a governments type and
announcement, and is thus denoted by WPO(; ^).
 Whichever country announces the highest tari¤ faces a probability, depending on its an-
nouncement, of being punished from the next period onwards, for T consecutive periods. We
refer to the latter possibility as an asymmetric stage denoted by A or A; where the former
(latter) refers to home (foreign) being the punished. It is not necessary to describe the exact
punishments at this point, but it su¢ ces to point out that punishments involve playing xed
rules (independent of announcements) and that the government that is punished receives
lower expected welfare than its punishing counterpart. Denote expected welfare from being
punished in any given period by WP , and of punishing by WR.
 After T periods of asymmetric phase, the game reverts back to the symmetric stage.
 If at any point there is an observable deviation from these strategies, the communication
game reverts to the non-collusive phase forever (Nash - Reversion).
Denition 1 In stage S the probability of moving to stage A is dened by
p(^; ^

)

(^) if ^ > ^

0 otherwise
whereas the probability of moving to stage A is dened analogously by
p(^; ^

)

(^

) if ^ < ^

0 otherwise
Note from the previous denition that, once the game is in the symmetric stage, it will remain
in it with probability 1  (^)  (^): The idea of the present mechanism is therefore straightfor-
ward: by increasing their announcements, governments are entitled to higher import tari¤s in the
symmetric stage, but they also increase the likelihood of being punished in the subsequent periods.
Having set up the mechanism, we can now state explicitly that communication is not a restric-
tive assumption. Clearly, we could achieve exactly the same structure by omitting the announce-
ments altogether. In such a scenario, the probability of future punishments would directly depend
on which government set the highest tari¤ and on the level at which the latter was set. Thus,
the symmetric phase without communication would be equivalent to that of our mechanism, since
there is a one-to-one relationship between politically optimal tari¤s and announcements. In the
asymmetric phase, on the other hand, communication plays no role and can be dispensed with.
In order to establish the existence of an equilibrium and to analyze its welfare properties, we
formulate governmentsdecision problems in a recursive fashion and solve for incentive compati-
bility. If we let vM denote a governments average payo¤ from following the mechanismM , then it
19
must satisfy the following recursive equation of v for a given transition probability function :20
v = (1  )WPO + 
Z H
L
Z H
L
 
v + p(; )(1  T )(WP +WR   2v) g()g()dd (18)
Additionally,  must satisfy on-schedule IC constraints, since it must induce truthtelling during
the symmetric stage. Working from (18), we can obtain such an expression for ;
(^) =
(1  )
(1  T )(v  WP )
Z ^
L
1
F (')

@WPO(')
@'
g(')

e
  (WR WP )
(v WP )
R ^
'
f()
F ()
d
d' (19)
From (18) and (19) it is possible to obtain the following equation for v = vM follows:
(v) = 0 = v  WPO   W
P +WR   2v
v  WP y(v) (20)
where y(v) is dened as follows,
y(v) =
Z H
L
Z 
L
Z 
L
1
F (')

@WPO(')
@'
f(')

e
  (WR WP )
(v WP )
R 
'
f()
F ()
d
d'g()g()dd
This leads us to the following theorem, which replicates Aoyagis Theorem 1.
Theorem 4 If (v) has a solution v strictly greater than vN then for a su¢ ciently large discount
factor  the retaliatory mechanism is an equilibrium for some probability function (:) and T and
yields payo¤ vM = v:
Proof. See Appendix.
In terms of AD, Theorem 6 can be interpreted as follows. Assume that, instead of xing tari¤s
at a given level, governments are allowed to raise them according to the claims they make regarding
the degree of political pressure that they face domestically. However, in doing so, a government
increases the likelihood of entering a punishment phase. In such a phase, its trading partner is
allowed to set - on average - higher tari¤s. If, in expectation, governments can outperform the
static Nash payo¤, then our mechanism has an equilibrium. In order for it to be consequential,
then, the result requires us to show that this condition holds.
Formally, what is left to show for the existence of an equilibrium is that (v) does in fact
have a solution greater than vN : in other words, it must be shown that vM > vN :21 We deal with
this problem in an indirect fashion. In particular, we assume the general existence of a static tari¤
rule (in which countries announcements do not a¤ect next periods problem) that outperforms the
20Note that, formally speaking, WPO includes expected welfare in both the import and export markets and
thus depends through the latter on foreigns announcement. However, since we focus here on the e¤ect of own
announcements on the import market, we treat this current payo¤ as depending only on such announcements.
21Of course, this must hold in order to avoid o¤-schedule deviations.
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Nash equilibrium. This is an uncontroversial assumption since, if that were not the case, then
the discussion regarding the discretionary use of AD would be meaningless: indeed, any potential
static rule designed to govern the use of AD, including its outright prohibition, would be weakly
dominated by the stage game Nash equilibrium.22 Below, we will show that this assumption holds
in our benchmark parametrization of the model.
Assuming then the existence of such a rule, we will show that it can always be outperformed
by a dynamic mechanism, in which countriesannouncements do a¤ect their continuation payo¤s.
In order to do so, note that the overall payo¤ of the mechanism developed above is bounded from
below by a convex combination of WPO and W
P+WR
2 ; expressed as follows:
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vM > L =
WR  WP
WR  WP + 2KW
PO +
2K
WR  WP + 2K
 
WP +WR

2
(21)
where K is a constant dened by,
K =
Z H
L
Z 
L
W 0PO(L)g(
)dd
Now, consider for a moment an optimal static rule. Take, for example, the class of rules
by which countries must place their tari¤s at a xed, prespecied level, and denote the welfare
maximizing tari¤ within that class by  : As we said before, we assume that such a rule outperforms
the Nash equilibrium, and we denote the expected welfare associated to its application as v:
We proceed by embedding such a rule into our mechanism, so that when the game enters into
a punishment stage the punished (punishing) country will be forced to slightly lower (raise) its
tari¤ below (above)  ; so that WR  WP = ". Note that, by denition of  , WP +WR  2v since
minor perturbations of the xed tari¤ will not have rst-order e¤ects on joint expected welfare. In
the appendix we show that our mechanism can guarantee a payo¤ strictly greater than v: We do
so, following Aoyagi [3], by introducing a lower bound for the payo¤ of our mechanism, L; and then
showing that
vM > L =
"
"+ 2K
WPO +
2K
"+ 2K
v > v
proving that any static rule involving the used of a xed tari¤  which outperforms the Nash
equilibrium can in turn be outperformed by (locally) introducing asymmetry24. It is not hard to
see how this argument can be replicated for any such class of rules.
22There is an additional reason for comparing our mechanism with static rules: in many settings, these are in fact
optimal within the class of symmetric PPE. For a discussion on this issue, see Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2002).
23For a proof of this inequality, see the Appendix.
24This point can in fact be stressed somewhat further by highlighting that - as is well known - whenever asymmetry
in payo¤s during the punishment phase can be increased without substantially sacricing e¢ ciency, the mechanisms
payo¤ will also increase. To see this, note that from (21) it can be assessed that the mechanisms payo¤s is increasing
in the di¤erence
 
WR  WP  as long as the following condition holds:
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To summarize, our argument is as follows. Suppose that instead of letting governments freely
adjust their tari¤s, they are forced to x them at a pre-specied rate: in particular, they x them
at the rate  that maximizes joint expected welfare. Then, there is an equilibrium which does
strictly better. In such an equilibrium, governments are allowed to adjust their tari¤s in line with
their announcements. High announcements by any one of them, however, increase the likelihood
of entering a second phase in which: a) the government that initiated the phase must set its tari¤
below  , and b) its trading partner must set its tari¤ above  : Observationally, our mechanism
would imply that - for any one government - periods of intensive use of tari¤s relative to its trading
partner should alternate with periods in which the opposite holds.
A last issue we want to point our is the following: although the mechanism is welfare improving,
it could well be the case that it requires higher levels of patience than the rigid scheme which it
manages to outperform. In other words, the mechanism could fail to be an equilibrium for some
patience levels that nonetheless support the rigid scheme. If this were the case, it is hard to argue
that the former does unequivocally better than the latter. This issue has not been addressed in
Aoyagi [3], but we believe it to be important when comparing or judging di¤erent mechanisms. In
the next lemma, we prove that our mechanism can be supported for weakly lower levels of patience
than the optimal rigid rule. This allows us to conrm that the asymmetric mechanism can fully
improve upon the rigid rule, i.e., it can do so for a given level of patience.
Lemma 5 The critical patience level needed to avoid deviations in the mechanism involving retal-
iation is weakly lower than the one required to support the underlying optimal rigid rule:
Proof. See Appendix.
5.4 Example25
We now illustrate our results for the benchmark parametrization mentioned previously. For matters
of convenience and comparison we take the parameters to be very similar to the ones used by Bagwell
and Staiger [10]:
 = 1  = 1  = 12
 = 1 L = 1 H = 1:5
@
 
WP +WR

@ (WR  WP ) >
WP +WR   2K
WR  WP + 2K
=  1 + 2W
R
WR  WP + 2K >  1
25 In this section we will conne ourselves to only provide the (numerical) results. For further clarication please
contact the authors.
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Figure 2: Lower Bound L(")
This allows us to compute the tari¤s and expected welfare of each of the following regimes
Nash Political Optimum xed tari¤
tari¤ : () 8 568 8
8 8
50 8 0:05
expected welfare vN = 0:44981 vPO = 0:45038 v = 0:45
We now show the two main results of the last section. First, we demonstrate that the asym-
metric mechanism can outperform the best xed tari¤. Later, we show that it can do so for the
same levels of patience.
Let us demonstrate the rst claim by assuming that - in the punishment phase - the punishing
and punished governments set tari¤s equal to   " (0:05+ "). We can compute the lower bound L
to the mechanisms payo¤ as a function of " (for small values of "). L(") is given by the following
relationship, which is plotted below.
L(") = 0:45 +
0:003 257 1"
8: 571 4"+ 0:5831
> v for all " > 0
Note that the lower bound of our mechanisms payo¤ is higher than the expected welfare of
the xed rule. Thus, under our parametrization, governments should set  = :05 if they want
to adopt a xed rule. However, they can increase their expected welfare by announcing their
preferences and adjusting their tari¤s according to their announcements. This is done by letting
higher announcements increase the likelihood of being punished, i.e., of entering a phase in which
the punished government is forced to set tari¤s at lower levels than its trading partner.
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We now tackle the second issue: patience. Playing the xed tari¤ each period yields current
expected welfare W () and lifetime expected welfare v: In order to support this scheme we need to
deter governments from deviating o¤-schedule. Let  be the critical discount factor so that, for all
 > ; the rigid scheme is supported. It turns out that  = 0:944 19: We will study how the upper
bound on the critical patience level of our asymmetric mechanism changes with di¤erent levels of
small punishment26. Again we consider punishments of size ": The results can readily be seen from
the graph below which displays a strict upper bound for the critical delta for a each (small) level of
punishment. In the limit (" = 0) ; not surprisingly, this upper bound is as in the same as xed tari¤
case. This conrms our statement that our mechanism fully outperforms the static mechanism as
it yields higher expected welfare for every positive level of "; without needing to sacrice patience.
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The present paper has tried to interpret empirical evidence regarding the use of AD. On one hand,
there is strong support to the idea that governments use AD measures in a retaliatory fashion.
Additionally, the use of AD seems to be signicantly inuenced by political lobbying, at least in
the United States.
How are we to reconcile our model with the existing evidence? If the evidence were to be
interpreted in an extreme way, it could be said that there is no such thing as antidumping measures,
only premiums added to tari¤s on the basis of political preferences. Of course, some of the use
26We only focus on incentives in the asymmetric punishment phase. In the symmetric phase a higher level of
patience than  leads to a direct contradiction with  = 0:05; since  < PO(H) = 2
19
(see appendix).
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of AD does in fact respond to the existence of dumped imports: in any case, the latter can be
explained through the traditional economic reasoning, and our model deals only with the strategic
use of this instrument.
If it is assumed that baseline tari¤s are relatively stable, and AD is used as a way to accommo-
date them to shifting political preferences, then a theory of retaliatory AD is essentially a theory
of retaliatory tari¤s. This is exactly the story behind our model, although some clarication is
required.
In the rst place, the fact that it is e¢ cient for tari¤s to change in light of changing political
preferences does not seem very controversial: the problem is, what is to keep governments from
abusing such an instrument in order to inuence terms of trade in their favor? We have tried to
answer this question by analyzing di¤erent scenarios: in particular, we have shown that an adequate
system of transfers or export subsidies will prevent governments from misreporting their preferences,
thus achieving e¢ ciency on a per-period basis. The use of transfers, however, is rarely observed in
the world, whereas the use of subsidies is restricted both by WTO/GATT and - potentially - by
liquidity constraints.
Once we remove these policy instruments, then, we are left only with import tari¤s. We
show that, in such a scenario, it might well be that some degree of retaliation is welfare enhancing
with respect to a static rule regulating the use of AD. Governments accommodate their tari¤s to
shifting political preferences, but high reports by any one of them today - and, therefore, higher
tari¤s today - will generate higher expected tari¤s on behalf of their trading partner tomorrow.
Thus, its retaliation and the threat of retaliation what achieves incentive compatibility in our
model.27
Of course, our model is admittedly oversimplied in treating AD simply as tari¤s which may be
freely adjusted by governments. This simplication, though, does not seem substantially restrictive
if - as the critics of AD claim - this instrument is to a large degree being used in an arbitrary fashion
that bears little relation to the objectives for which it was created. In this sense, it is important
to highlight the extent to which the debate over AD has spread when compared to other policy
instruments, such as safeguards: one of the reasons which might account for the di¤erence in the
treatment dispensed to these apparently similar instruments seems to be precisely that the way in
which the latter is designed discourages governments from using it arbitrarily. In fact, not only is
the standard for establishing injury stricter under a safeguard action than under AD regulations28,
but - for the period to which the cited empirical studies refer - the use of safeguards has also
27We must stress, once more, that we have tried to convey the point in the way which seemed most straightforward
for the purposes of this paper. An alternative approach would have been to allow for the existence of reputational
stocks between governments, so that higher announcements by any one of them allow the other government to increase
future expected tari¤s. We felt, however, that such a mechanism would be too involved and distractive of our main
argument: the interested reader can get a avor of this alternative from our working paper [?].
28 In particular, the domestic industry must demonstrate the presence or threat of serious injury.
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entailed compensation for the damaged party.29
In spite of these simplications, however, we feel that the idea we have tried to convey is
simple enough while being consistent with the evidence regarding the use of AD: namely, than in
a world of restricted instruments, the strategic or retaliatory use of the remaining ones may be the
most e¢ cient way to deal with hidden information. In Tinbergens terms, it could be said that
the instruments available to countries should be analyzed jointly and in relation to the objectives
which are to be attained. We believe that this should be kept in mind when designing rules for
international cooperation since, in restricting the use of some of the instruments usually available
to governments, these rules might trigger the use of other instruments in new and unforeseen ways.
To conclude, we comment briey on what is possibly the main shortcoming of our setting:
the use of random, i.i.d. political preferences. On this point, we believe that the use of political
preferences which are correlated over time would provide a more realistic and appealing view of
the problem, and we leave this extension as an area for future research.
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7 Appendix30
7.1 Repeated Model with Transfers and Tari¤s
In the presence of transfers and tari¤s, the welfare of home would be dened as,
W (;C) =Wx(
PO
x (^); ) + t(^) +
Z H
L
Wy(
PO
y (
))g()d + v (22)
where we assume the use of an obedient tari¤ rule and POx (^) denotes the politically optimal
tari¤, t(^) denotes the transfer instructed by the center and v represents the continuation payo¤.
Local on-schedule incentive compatibility then requires that,
@W
@^ j^=
= 0
which, in terms of (22), implies
@Wx
@^ j^=
+ t0() = (Wpwx
@pwx
@x
+Wpx
@px
@x
)
@POx ()
@
+ t0() = 0 (23)
30Some of the proofs contained in this Appendix are almost exact replicas of those contained in Aoyagi (2003).
Nonetheless, we choose to reproduce them here for the readers convenience.
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Obviously, then, any instruction rule that calls for the use of politically optimal tari¤s and a
transfer function that satises,
t0() =  Wpwx
@pwx
@x
@POx ()
@
(24)
will be enough to achieve e¢ ciency while satisfying on-schedule incentive compatibility con-
straints (henceforth, we denote a transfer function satisfying (24) as t^). In the rst place, such an
instruction rule will make it optimal for importing countries to truthfully reveal their type, for the
simple reason that the incentive to over-represent disappears through the transfer.31 Additionally,
e¢ ciency is guaranteed by the fact that the instruction rule entails the use of politically optimal
tari¤s for all reports: since the latter will be truthful, import tari¤s will consequently be set at
their e¢ cient levels.
The last issue we need to address is whether the o¤-schedule incentive compatibility constraints
are satised. In other words, will both countries use e¢ cient tari¤ rules? Since, as we said before,
observable deviations trigger Nash-reversion, this will be the case if countries are su¢ ciently patient.
This proves our proposition.
7.2 Proof of Existence Theorem
First note that because of Nash reversion in the presence of observable deviations, the latter are
easily deterred if vM > vN : Let v > vN be a solution to (20). Then choose T such that,
T >
1
(v  WP )
Z H
L
1
F (')

@WPO(')
@'
g(')

d' (25)
Since v > vN by assumption, it is clear that there exists a value  < 1 above which o¤-schedule
deviations are avoided. Additionally, note that (25) also assures us that
(1  )
(1  T )(v  WP )
Z H
L
1
F (')

@WPO(')
@'
g(')

d' < 1 (26)
since
lim
!1
(1  )
(1  T ) =
1
T
meaning that T can always be chosen large enough so as to make (26) be smaller than one.
Thus, given a discount factor  >  we dene the probability of transition to the asymmetric
stage A when homes report is higher than that of foreign as,
31Global incentive compatibility is given by the fact that our model satises the SCP, since the marginal welfare
of an increase in the domestic price of the import good increases with :
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(^) =
(1  )
(1  T )(v  WP )
Z ^
L
1
F (')

@WPO(')
@'
g(')

e
  (WR WP )
(v WP )
R ^
'
g()
F ()
d
d' (27)
which is indeed a probability due to our choice of T and .
Following Aoyagi (2003), we divide the existence proof into three steps. After xing T; v
and  > , we rst prove that each governments payo¤ is indeed v when playing the honest and
obedient strategy under the mechanism. In a second and third step we show that the on- and
o¤-schedule incentive compatibility constraints are satised: in addressing these points, we invoke
the one-shot deviation property as we explain in the main body of the paper.
Step 1: From (18), we can obtain
v =WPO   (1  
T )
1   (2v  W
P  WR)
Z H
L
Z ^
L
()dg()d
If the expression for (^) derived above is substituted in the previous equation, we obtain
equation (20) from the main body of the paper. Since the latter is by assumption solved by v; it
follows that v = vM .
Step 2: the o¤-shcedule IC constraints are satised. This can be easily shown to be the case
since, by assumption, v > vN . One one hand, the one-shot gain from observable deviations is
bounded from above by our welfare assumptions. Additionally, the smallest possible loss from
deviation occurs during the rst period of punishment, in which expected welfare yielded by the
mechanism is given by,
(1  T )WP + T v
Thus, there exists a critical value of ; which we previously denoted by , such that for all
 >  o¤-schedule deviations are avoided.
Step 3: on-schedule IC constraints are satised. Note that reports do not inuence payo¤s in
the asymmetric stages A and A. Thus, it remains to be checked that the constraints are satised
in the symmetric stage S:We do so by rst showing that these constraints are satised locally, and
then argue that the presence of a SCP guarantees their being satised globally as well.
We use v(; ^) to denote the interim expected payo¤ for home when she receives signal  and
announces ^ (for foreign this is dened analogously) :
v(; ^) = (1  )
Z H
L
WPO(; )g()d
+
24 R ^L v + (^)(1  T )(WP   v) g()d
+
R H
^
 
v + ()(1  T )(WR   v) g()d
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which reduces to,
v(; ^) = (1  )
Z H
L
WPO(; )g()d (28)
+
"
v   (1  T )(v  WP )F (^)(^)
+(WR   v)(1  T ) R H
^
()g()d
#
Then local IC implies, since markets are separated, that
@v(; ^)
@^ j=^
= 0
which in our setting reduces to
(1  )@W
PO
x (; ^)
@
= (1  T )(v  WP )F ()@()
@
+(WR  WP )(1  T )()g()
Note that the previous expression can be reduced to a linear di¤erential equation in ;
@()
@
+
(WR  WP )()g()
(v  WP )F () =
(1  )@WPOx (;)@
(1  T )(v  WP )F ()
which is in turn satised by  as dened in (27). Thus, with the probability of entering the
asymmetric stage dened in the aforementioned manner, the on-schedule IC constraints are locally
satised in the symmetric stage of the collusive phase.
It thus remains only to show that the IC constraints are also satised globally. In our setting,
this follows directly from the SCP. In fact, note from (28) that
@v(; ^)
@^@
= (1  )@W
PO(^; )
@^@
> 0
since there is no e¤ect of a countrys current type on its continuation payo¤s, which depend
only the announcements. Thus, since countries with higher political economy parameters place
relatively higher values on tari¤ increases, we are guaranteed that the on-schedule IC constraints
are satised globally, which concludes the proof of the theorem.
7.3 Proof of Inequality (21)
Note that (20) has a solution between (
WP+WR)
2 and W
PO. This stems from the fact that y(v) > 0
whenever v > WP ; so that
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(WPO) =
2WPO  WP  WR
WPO  WP y(W
PO) > 0
(
WP +WR
2
) =
WP +WR
2
 WPO < 0
By the intermediate value theorem there exists v^ 2 (WP+WR2 ;WPO) that makes (v^) = 0: In
turn, for any such solution v^ and  we can write,Z 
L
1
F (')

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@'
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
e
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(v^ WP )
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< W 0PO()
(v^  WP )
(WR  WP )  W
0PO(L)
(v^  WP )
(WR  WP )(L; )  (29)
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W
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 (v^  WP )
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where (L; ) = e
  (WR WP )
(v^ WP )
R 
L
g()
F ()
d
: Note that it is possible to rewrite (29) as
= W 0PO()
(v^  WP )
(WR  WP )  W
0PO(L)
(v^  WP )
(WR  WP )(L; ) 
(v^  WP )
(WR  WP )(W
0PO() W 0PO(L))
= W 0PO(L)
(v^  WP )
(WR  WP )(1  (L; ))
< W 0PO(L)
(v^  WP )
(WR  WP )
It follows then that,
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y(v) <
Z H
L
Z 
L
W 0PO(L)
(v^  WP )
(WR  WP )d
g()d
=
(v^  WP )
(WR  WP )K
where
K = W 0PO(L)
Z H
L
Z 
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dg()d
= W 0PO(L)
Z H
L
(   L)
1
H   L
d
= W 0PO(L)
H   L
2
Therefore, from (20) it follows that
v^ WPO   2v^  W
P  WR
WR  WP K
which delivers (21) when one solves for v^.
7.4 Delta comparison
Although we have shown that our (asymmetric) mechanism can outperform any optimal rigid
scheme, it might concern us that this gain in e¢ ciency could come at a cost in terms of patience.
We prove we need not worry as our mechanism can be sustained at weakly lower levels of patience
than the optimal rigid scheme which it outperforms.
Lemma 6 Dene  as the critical level of patience needed to support the best fully rigid scheme.
The asymmetric mechanism can outperform the latter for weakly lower levels of patience.
Proof. Again, lets pick the best fully rigid scheme: the xed tari¤ that ex ante maximizes
joint welfare,  : Playing this tari¤ each period yields current expected welfare W () and lifetime
expected welfare v: In order to support this scheme we need to deter countries from deviating o¤-
schedule. Let  be the critical discount factor so that, for all  > ; the rigid scheme is supported.
This is the case when :
(1  )WBRx () + vN = (1  ) Wx() + v
 = max


WBRx ()  Wx()
WBRx ()  Wx() + v   vN

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Where WBRx () is the welfare in the import market from deviating to the current best response for
a given political preference.
Since we wish to prove that the asymmetric mechanism requires a discount factor lower than
 while still outperforming the rigid benchmark, we assume arbitrarily low levels of asymmetry.
Taking this into account, we proceed in two steps: rst, we show that the discount factor needed
to support o¤-schedule IC in the asymmetric phase is lower than . Then we repeat the same
argument for the symmetric phase.
Note that, as we have mentioned previously in the appendix, the critical level of patience re-
quired to support the asymmetric mechanism () is also determined by the o¤-schedule constraint.
Indeed, the on-schedule constraints are independent of the discount factor since they can always
be taken care of by adjusting the length of the punishment T .
1. Asymmetric phase: note that the highest incentive to deviate in the asymmetric phase occurs
in its rst period. Hence we focus on the latter and determine, in the same fashion as above,
the critical patience level  in the asymmetric phase to be:
(1  )WBRx () + vN = (1  )WPx () + [(1  T 1)WP + T 1v]
But since the mechanism outperforms the rigid scheme, we have that v > v and we can write
(1  )WBR() + vN > (1  )WPx () + [(1  T 1)WP + T 1v] (30)
Consider now the latter term: for WP close to v, there exists some small " > 0 for which the
following holds,
(1  )WPx () + [(1  T 1)WP + T 1v] (31)
=
(1  ) Wx() + v   "
So that by replacing (30) into (31) we obtain,
 < max


WBR() WPx ()  "
WBR() WPx () + v   vN

But for every small " the asymmetric mechanism outperforms the rigid benchmark and, in the
limit,
 < max


WBR() WPx ()
WBR() WPx () + v   vN

= 
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which proves that a lower level of patience is needed in order to avoid o¤-equilibrium deviations
in the asymmetric phase.
2. Symmetric Phase: we now prove that, if the rigid rule is optimal, the level of patience needed
to avoid o¤ equilibrium deviations along the symmetric phase is also lower than :
For any given ; the benet of deviating o¤-equilibrium (assuming truthfulness) at the sym-
metric phase for a country of type  is given by
(1  )WBRx () + vN   (1  )WPOx ()  v()
Note that it is always the highest type - H - the one for whom the previous di¤erence is
maximized. This can be easily seen by di¤erentiating the expression, yielding,
(1  )@W
BR
x ()
@
  (1  )@W
PO
x ()
@
(32)
A few things must be said about this di¤erentiation. When the type changes, there is a
direct impact on welfare (through the political preference parameter) and an indirect impact which
is channeled through tari¤s. However, the latter does not have any e¤ects. In the case of best
response tari¤s, this is due to the envelope theorem, while in the case of politically optimal tari¤s,
this is due to the fact that the mechanism satises on-schedule incentive compatibility along the
symmetric phase. Thus, the only determinant of (32) is the direct impact of an increase in type on
a governments welfare, which in turn is increasing in producerssurplus: since the latter is always
higher under best-response tari¤s than under their PO counterparts, (32) does not have an interior
maximum and is greatest for H .
Lets assume that the maximum gain from o¤-schedule deviations in the symmetric phase is
higher than the one corresponding to the optimal rigid rule. Due to our previous discussion, this
must imply that,
(1  )WBRx (H) + vN   (1  )WPOx (H)  v(H)
>
(1  )WBRx (H) + vN   (1  ) Wx(H)  v
Which in turn reduces to,
Wx(
H) WPOx (H) >

(1  )(v(
H)  v)
Obviously, for low levels of punishment (v(H)   v) > 0: Hence, the only way in which the
above inequality could be satised is if Wx(H) > WPOx (
H): But the latter inequality would in
35
turn imply that  > PO(H) > PO() for all other values of : This clearly contradicts  being
an optimal rigid rule, since expected welfare could be increased by lowering it.
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